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To overcome the signal disturbance from the transmission process, recently, a new type
of protocol named round-robin differential-phase-shift(RRDPS) quantum key distribu-
tion[Nature 509, 475(2014)] is proposed. It can estimate how much information has leaked
to eavesdropper without monitoring bit error rates. In this paper, we compare the per-
formance of RRDPS using different sources without and with decoy-state method, such
as weak coherent pulses(WCPs) and heralded single photon source(HSPS). For practical
implementations, we propose finite decoy-state method for RRDPS, the performance of
which is close to the infinite one. Taking WCPs as an example, the three-intensity decoy-
state protocol can distribute secret keys over a distance of 128 km when the length of
pulses packet is 32, which confirms the great practical interest of our method.
1
Introduction
Quantum key distribution(QKD)1, 2 enables two legitimate communication participants, Alice
and Bob, to share identical keys based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. It has
been a kind of information security technology raised from modern cryptography and quantum
mechanics. QKD can be considered the most important application of quantum physics. Many
papers have proven the security of Bennett-Brassard-1984(BB84) protocol3, 4. Subsequently the
experimental implementation also made great progress5–7. So far, commercial products have
already become available. However, due to the symmetry of BB84 protocol, the phase error
rate is equal to the bit error rate. Needing to estimate the amount of leaked information by
randomly sampling the signal, BB84 protocol may overestimate the leaked information and
limit the threshold of the error rate.
Recently, a quantum key distribution protocol called round-robin differential phase-shift(RRDPS)
was proposed by Sasaki et al.8, which can generate keys without monitoring signal disturbance
of the measurement outcomes and has no restriction on the error rate9. RRDPS is a novel
method to encode raw key bits even with the existence of eavesdropper, in which Bob specifies
randomly how to calculate the sifted key from the raw key bits. Due to the large number of
pulses in a packet, RRDPS system has higher stability and lower loss. It can tolerate a noisier
channel than the conventional one. Up to now, many modified schemes have been proposed
and several experimental demonstrations have been performed10–13. Using a receiver set-up to
randomly choose one of four interferometers with different delays, Takesue et al.10 reported
a proof-of-principle QKD experiment based on RRDPS protocol. Wang et al.11 demonstrated
an active implementation of this protocol, and their system can distribute secret keys over a
distance of 90 km. Implementation results show that the protocol is feasible with current tech-
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nology, especially in high-error situations11.
Similar to the standard QKD protocol, most researches of RRDPS use weak coherent
pulses(WCPs) as a replacement of the perfect single-photon source. Heralded single photon
source (HSPS), is also within reach of current technology and can be considered as the candidate
of the perfect single-photon source. So the performance of this source in RRDPS remains to be
further studied.
In BB84 protocol, decoy-state method14–17 can be used to efficiently estimate the contri-
bution of the single-photon pulse and significantly increase the transmission distance of secure
keys. Many researchers have studied the practicability of decoy-state method. Ma et al. 17 first
studied the statistical fluctuation analysis for the decoy state. Similarly, Zhang et al.9 proposed
the infinite decoy-state method for RRDPS. Their method is valid in the asymptotic limit with
an infinite number of decoy states, thus it has some limitations in practice. We extend it to the
practical case with a finite number of decoy states.
First of all, we compare the performance of WCPs and HSPS in different pulse packet
lengths. Then, fixing the packet length at 32, we simulate the infinite decoy-state method using
these two sources. Since infinite decoy-state method is difficult to achieve in practice, we put
forward a finite decoy-state protocol. Taking WCPs as an example, bounds on the yields and
quantum bit error rates of some photon number states are stated. At last, considering that
contributions from three and more photons are not obvious, we employ three-intensity decoy-
state method.
3
Results
Round-robin differential-phase-shift protocol
The round-robin differential-phase-shift protocol encodes raw key bits coherently so that
only a few bits can be read out at the same time. It is hard for Eve to guess the sifted key. The
ideal protocol, between two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, runs as follows.
1. State Preparation. Alice prepares packets of pulses containing L pulses, and generates
a random L-bit sequence, s = (s1, s2, · · · , sL). Then she encodes the sequence into the phase
of each pulse, 0(when si = 0) or pi(when si = 1), and sends the pulse packets to Bob. We
consider that the encoded signal is a superposition photon state of pulses8
|ψ >= 1√
L
L∑
k=1
(−1)sk |k > (1)
where sk is the encoded bit sequence, |k > denotes that the photon is in the k-th pulse.
2. Measurement. Upon receiving the states, Bob randomly sets the pulse delay value
r(1 ≤ r ≤ L − 1), and splits each received L-pulse train into two. Then Bob delays one of
the train and interferes with the other. After measuring interference between the two trains, the
detection result shows the phase difference between two pulses i andj ({i, j} ⊂ {1, 2, · · ·L})
satisfying j − i = ±r(modL). The value of the relative phase sB = si ⊕ sj is a sifted key of
Bob.
3. Sifting. Bob announces {i, j} to Alice through classical channel, so that Alice com-
putes sA = si ⊕ sj as her sifted key.
4. Post Processing. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1-3 to accumulate enough sifted key. They
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perform error correction and privacy amplification on the sifted key to extract the final secure
key.
The sketch of the protocol is shown in the Figure 1.
[ht]
The secure key length of QKD protocol is given by 4
G = N [1 − f · h(ebit)− h(ephase)] (2)
where N is the sifted key length, f corresponds to the efficiency of error correction, and h(e) =
−e log e− (1− e) log(1− e) is the binary Shannon entropy function. Moreover, ebit and ephase
are the bit error rate and phase error rate respectively.
As for RRDPS protocol, the phase error rate depends on the preparation of quantum states
rather than the transmission process. When the number of photons in a packet is no more than
an integer vth(vth < L−12 ), in the analysis of Sasaki et al., the phase error rate can be bounded
by vth/(L− 1) 8. While they assume that Eve completely knows the sifted key bits from the
rest part(v > vth).
Zhang et al.9 improved the phase error estimation by considering the encoding details of
the quantum signal. The phase error rate is given by
enph =
1− (1− 2/L)n
2
. (3)
When the number of photons satisfies v < vth, phase error rate can be bounded by 1−(1−2/L)
vth
2
,
which accords a tighter and more reasonable bound on the phase error rate.
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Hence, the improved phase error rate estimation of source satisfying Pr(v > vth) ≤ esrc
is expressed by8, 9
eph =
esrc
Q
+ (1− esrc
Q
)
1− (1− 2/L)vth
2
(4)
where Q is the empirical rate of detection Q = N/Nem, and Nem corresponds to the number
of packets emitted from Alice. There are Nemesrc rounds satisfying the number of photons
v > vth, which are regarded as a phase error in the worst case scenario. So the first term of this
equation stands for the fraction of phase error rate where the photons in a packet have exceeded
vth, and the second one refers to that of packets whose photons are no larger than vth.
On account of this classification, the secure key rate per packet can be calculated to be8
R = (Q− esrc)(1− f · h(ebit)− h(1− (1− 2/L)
vth
2
))− esrc · f · h(ebit). (5)
The former part is the contribution of packets containing photons exceeding vth, while the
latter one is that of packets containing photons no more than vth. From this equation, it is clear
that the larger L is, the higher secure key rate of per packet we can obtain.
Finite decoy-state RRDPS protocol
Decoy-state method14 has been proposed as a useful method to improve the performance
of QKD protocols when using an imperfect single-photon source. Similarly, the decoy-state for
RRDPS protocol also have been employed9. Here, we review the idea of decoy-state RRDPS.
Denote QLµ =
∞∑
n=0
YnPLµ(n) to be the overall gain when the source intensity is Lµ, and
HPA to be the ratio of key rate that is sacrificed in privacy amplification. According to Eq.(2),
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the final key rate of per packet can also be written as 9
R = QLµ[1− f · h(ebit)−HPA]. (6)
Define Yn to be the yield of n-photon state, which means the conditional probability of a
detection event at Bob side when Alice sends out n-photon state. Note that Y0 is the background
rate, including the detector dark count and other background contributions. Denote Pµ(n) to
be the possibility of n photons when the mean number is µ. The amount of key loss can be
calculated as9
QLµHPA =
∞∑
n=0
YnPLµ(n)h(e
n
ph). (7)
Yn cannot be measured directly, but we can accurately estimate it with infinite decoy
states. Without the interference of Eve, it is given by17
Yn = 1− (1− Y0)(1− η)n. (8)
And the error rate en can be obtained from17
en =
e0Y0 + ed(1− Y0)[1− (1− η)n]
Yn
. (9)
In practice, the number of decoy states cannot be chosen freely. As the number of intensity
increases, the enforcement of the protocol may be more challengeable. So it is worthy to study
finite decoy-state method. For practical implementations, since contributions from states with
large photon numbers are negligible comparing with those from small photon numbers, only a
few decoy states will be sufficient. The final key rate can be rewritten as
R =
nth∑
n=0
YnPLµ(n)(1− f · h(enbit)− h(enph)) (10)
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where Yn is defined to be the yield of an n-photon state, PLµ(n) refers to the possibility of
n photons when the mean number is Lµ, f corresponds to the efficiency of error correction,
and h(e) = −e log e − (1 − e) log(1 − e) is the binary Shannon entropy function. nth is the
threshold of the photon numbers that are efficient. Define enbit, enph to be the bit error rate and
phase error rate of n photons respectively. Yn and enbit need to be estimated by using the decoy
states method.
In BB84, a protocol with two decoy states, the vacuum and a weak decoy state, only
estimating the yield and error rate of single photon, asymptotically approaches the theoretical
limit of infinite decoy-state protocol17. Since multi-photons are also contributed to the secret
key in RRDPS, we propose finite decoy-state to estimate Y1, Y2, Y3 and e1, e2, e3, that is nth = 3.
Here we set an example of WCPs to show the calculation of these parameters.
Numerical simulation
To describe a practical system, a widely used fiber-based setup model is needed. When
the laser source is modeled WCPs, the density matrix of the state can be given by18
ρµ =
∫ 2π
0
dθ
2pi
|√µejϕ >< √µejϕ| =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
|n >< n| (11)
where |0 >< 0| is the vacuum state and |n >< n| is the density matrix of the n-photon state.
HSPS, like the commonly used WCPs, is also within reach of current technology as an-
other candidate of the perfect single-photon source. Given a two-mode state of the form18
(coshχ)−1
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)neinθ|n, n > (12)
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Set the intensity of the source µ to sinh2χ, then the above description simplifies to19
∞∑
n=0
√
µn
(1 + µ)n+1
einθ|n, n > . (13)
After triggering out one of a photon pair, the other mode is basically a field of distribution16
px =
1
Ppost(µ)
{ dA
1 + µ
|0 >< 0|+
∞∑
n=1
[1− (1− ηA)n] · µ
n
(1 + µ)n+1
|n >< n|} (14)
where µ is the mean photon number of one mode, ηA , dAaccount for the detection efficiency
and dark count rate of detector respectively. The post-selection probability isPpost(x) = dA1+x +
xηA
1+xηA
.
Considering the distribution of photons in Eq.11, the gain and QBER for using WCPs can
be calculated by17
QLµ =
∑
Yn
(Lµ)n
n!
e−Lµ = Y0 + (1− Y0)(1− e−Lηµ) (15)
ELµQLµ =
∑
enYn
(Lµ)n
(1 + Lµ)n+1
= e0Y0 + ed(1− Y0)(1− e−Lηµ) (16)
Based on the formula above, we use the following for the error rate9
ebit =
ELµQLµ
QLµ
=
e0Y0 + ed(1− Y0)(1− e−Lηµ)
Y0 + (1− Y0)(1− e−Lηµ) (17)
Denote the loss coefficient in the quantum channel to be α. For an optical-fiber-based
system, the relationship between the transmission distance d and the overall transmittance η is17
d = −10log10η
α
. (18)
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From these formulas, the overall gain and bit error rate for HSPS can be given by
QLµ =
∑
YnPLµ(n)
= Y0 · dA
(1 + Lµ) · Ppost(Lµ) +
∞∑
n=1
[1− (1− Y0)(1− η)n] · [1− (1− ηA)n] · (Lµ)
n
(1 + Lµ)n+1 · Ppost(Lµ)
=
dAY0(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ)
dA(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ)
− Lµ(1− Y0)(1 + LµηA)(1− η)
[dA(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ)](1 + Lµη)
(19)
+
Lµ(1− Y0)(1 + LµηA)(1− η)(1− ηA)
[dA(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ)](1 + Lµη + LµηA − LµηηA)
ELµQLµ =
∑
enYnPµ(n)
= e0Y0 · dA
(1 + Lµ) · Ppost(Lµ) +
∞∑
n=1
{[1− (1− η)n]} · [1− (1− ηA)n] · (Lµ)
n
(1 + Lµ)n+1 · Ppost(Lµ)
=
dAe0Y0(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ)[e0Y0 + ed(1− Y0)]
dA(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ)
(20)
− edLµ(1− Y0)(1 + LµηA)(1− η)
(dA(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ))(1 + Lµη)
+
edLµ(1− Y0)(1 + LµηA)(1− η)(1− ηA)
(dA(1 + LµηA) + LµηA(1 + Lµ))(1 + Lµη + LµηA − LµηηA)
Key rate per packet, R, represents the average net production length of secure key in a
fixed length packet. The final asymptotic secret key rate per packet can be given by equation
(5). For a fixed length packet, there are optimized mean photon numbers, µ, and thresholds of
photons in each packet, vth, in the process of transmission. To clarify the choice of µ and vth
intuitionally, we show the relationship among R, µ and vth as following Figure 2. The length
of each packet is fixed at 128. The channel transmission is 10−5. By changing values of two
variables, we can observe the affect of variables on optimization results of final key rate.
[ht]
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Various colors indicate diverse values of key rate per packet. By looking at the graph,
all the major values will show up clearly. It is obvious that key rate per packet has a maximum
point, where corresponding mean photon number and photons in each packet can be regarded as
optimal ones. So in the following simulation we adopt these optimal values for each condition
to obtain better key rates.
Let Q be the empirical rate of detection about channel transmission η. For the use of
WPCs and HSPS, the key rates per packet with different packet length and bit error rate, as a
function of channel transmission, is illustrated in Figure 3. Parameters used are listed in Table
1.
From the results shown in Figure 3, key rates per packet increase as the variation of
channel transmission. By simulation, we can see that the key rate or WCPs is mostly larger
than that for HSPS when L = 128. Two sources perform similarly if L is equal to 64 and
e = 0.03. When L equals to 32, HSPS performers better. In a word, WCPs is more suitable for
larger packet length while HSPS performs better with smaller packet.
According to the distribution of each source, we can obtain the probability of emitting
different numbers of photons among WCPs and HSPS. For a better interpretation of this fact,
we take a simple comparison in Figure 4.
[ht]
It is apparent that the results of Figure 4 and Figure 3 are coincident as a whole. Roughly
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speaking, when L = 128, the summation of photons contributing to secure key rate in WCPs is
larger than that in HSPS. These two summations are equal to each other while L = 64, then the
former one is less than the latter one when L = 32.
Applying the expressions ofQLµ and ebit to Eq.5, we can numerically compare the perfor-
mance of the two sources with decoy-state and without decoy-state. In order to give a faithful
estimation, we employ a reasonable model to forecast the result, taking example by a typical
QKD system6. Here, we fix L at 32, and other parameters used are listed in Table 1.
Combing Eq.6, Eq.7, 8, 9, we can calculate the final key generation rate of RRDPS proto-
col with and without decoy-state for WCPs and HSPS. For convenience of comparing, we use
the same parameters as above in Table 1. Our simulation results are shown in Figure 5.
The decoy-state method is often used to improve the secure key rate and transmission
distance in conventional protocol. The simulation result in Figure 5 clearly demonstrates that
this method is also effective for the RRPDS protocol. The performance of HSPS is much better
than WCPs under these two circumstances.
For the case of WCPs, we compare decoy-state methods for RRDPS protocol with dif-
ferent intensities: infinite decoy states, two-decoy-state method in which we just estimate Y1
and e1, three-intensity decoy-state estimating Y1, Y2, e1 and e2, four-decoy-states estimating Y1,
Y2, Y3, e1, e2 and e3.(see the Methods) Then, the comparison between the estimated values and
asymptotic values of yields and error rates are shown in Figure 6.
[ht]
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From the graph it is evident that the estimated values of yields are infinite approaching
the asymptotic values. The estimated error rates are very close to the asymptotic values. Since
we have presented partial lower bounds of yield and upper bounds of QBER, we will give an
example to show that, even in the case of finite, the performance of our method is close to that of
the infinite decoy method. We use the key parameter listed in Table I. Here, we also fix L at 32,
and optimize µ to obtain the maximum transmission distance. The simulation result indicates
that three decoy states are sufficient for the RRDPS protocol, which is shown in Figure 7.
[ht]
In the decoy-state method of BB84 protocol, only Y1 and e1 are needed to estimate, so a
few decoy states will be sufficient. This is because contributions from states with large photon
numbers are negligible comparing with those from small photon numbers. From the results,
we can see that contributions from two-photon state are considerable, while those from three
photons are not obvious. Therefore, it is dispensable to estimate yield and QBER when the
photon number is more than three.
Discussions
From the comparison between WCPs and HSPS, it is clear that they perform differently
with various packet lengths. WCPs is more suitable for larger packet length while HSPS per-
forms better with smaller packet. We anticipate that this result can guide the use of conventional
lasers. In current practice, attenuated lasers emitting WCPs are employed in most quantum sys-
tem. The technology on how to efficiently obtain HSPS has been developed to a high level. It
is pragmatic to experimentally test the conclusions from numerical simulations. For practical
implementations, we put forward finite decoy-state protocol. Since the key rate of the finite
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decoy-state method is close to the infinite one, our protocol can be regarded as a choice for
the practical experiment of RRDPS. Taking cost and and technological feasibility into account,
our scheme can be promising implementation of quantum cryptography. Compared with exist-
ing QKD protocol, there are still many aspects to improve for RRDPS. For example, the finite
length of key20 and its statistical fluctuations can significantly affect the security of RRDPS
protocol, which is of special concern.
Methods
Lower bound of Y1, Y2, Y3
Suppose Alice and Bob choose a signal state with intensity Lµ and four decoy states
whose intensities are Lv1, Lv2, Lv3, Lv4, which satisfies
Lv1 ≥ Lv2 ≥ Lv3 ≥ Lv4 ≥ 0, Lµ > Lv1 + Lv2 + Lv3 + Lv4. (21)
One can obtain the following gains and quantum bit error rates for the signal and decoy
14
states
QLµe
Lµ =
∞∑
n=0
Yn
(Lµ)n
n!
ELµQLµe
Lµ =
∞∑
n=0
enYn
(Lµ)n
n!
QLv1e
Lv1 =
∞∑
n=0
Yn
(Lv1)
n
n!
ELv1QLv1e
Lv1 =
∞∑
n=0
enYn
(Lv1)
n
n!
QLv2e
Lv2 =
∞∑
n=0
Yn
(Lv2)
n
n!
ELv2QLv2e
Lv2 =
∞∑
n=0
enYn
(Lv2)
n
n!
(22)
QLv3e
Lv3 =
∞∑
n=0
Yn
(Lv3)
n
n!
ELv3QLv3e
Lv3 =
∞∑
n=0
enYn
(Lv3)
n
n!
QLv4e
Lv4 =
∞∑
n=0
Yn
(Lv4)
n
n!
ELv4QLv4e
Lv4 =
∞∑
n=0
enYn
(Lv4)
n
n!
Given such equations, how can we obtain a tight lower bound on R. This is the main
problem for decoy-state protocols.
Based on v1QLv2eLv2 − v2QLv1eLv1 , a crude lower bound of Y0 can be chosen by17
Y0 ≥ Y0L = max(v1QLv2e
Lv2 − v2QLv1eLv1
v1 − v2 , 0) (23)
when Lv2 = 0 the equality sign will hold.
By QLv1eLv1 −QLv2eLv2 , it is clearly that
QLv1e
Lv1 −QLv2eLv2 ≤ Y1(Lv1 − Lv2) +
(Lv1)
2 − (Lv2)2
(Lµ)2
(QLµe
Lµ − Y L0 − Y1Lµ). (24)
Consequently, we obtain a minimum value of Y117
Y1 ≥ Y1L = µ
L(µv1 − µv2 − v12 + v22)(QLv1e
Lv1 −QLv2eLv2 −
v1
2 − v22
µ2
(QLµe
Lµ − Y L0 )).
(25)
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where Y L0 is the lower bound of Y0 calculated earlier.
Combine these two equations
QLv1e
Lv1 −QLv2eLv2 = Y1(Lv1 − Lv2) +
Y2
2!
((Lv1)
2 − (Lv2)2) + Y3
3!
((Lv1)
3 − (Lv2)3) + · · · (26)
QLv2e
Lv2 −QLv3eLv3 = Y1(Lv2 − Lv3) +
Y2
2!
((Lv2)
2 − (Lv3)2) + Y3
3!
((Lv2)
3 − (Lv3)3) + · · ·(27)
With (QLv1eLv1 −QLv2eLv2)× (v2 − v3)− (QLv2eLv2 −QLv3eLv3)× (v1 − v2), we also
have
(v2 − v3)Qv1ev1 − (v1 − v3)Qv2ev2 + (v1 − v2)Qv3ev3 ≤
Y2
2
L2(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2)
+
(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2)(v1 + v2 + v3)
µ3
(QLµe
Lµ − Y L0 − Y1LLµ −
Y2(Lµ)
2
2
) (28)
Therefore, we can bound Y2 by
Y2 ≥ Y2L = 2µ[(v2 − v3)QLv1e
Lv1 − (v1 − v3)QLv2eLv2 + (v1 − v2)QLv3eLv3 ]
L2(µ− v1 − v2 − v3)(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2)
− v1 + v2 + v3
(Lµ)2(µ− v1 − v2 − v3)
(QLµe
Lµ − Y L0 − Y1LLµ) (29)
As we have known,
(v2 − v3)QLv1eLv1 − (v1 − v3)QLv2eLv2 + (v1 − v2)QLv3eLv3
=
Y2
2!
L2(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2) + Y3
3!
L3(v2 − v3)(v1 − v2)(v1 − v3)(v1 + v2 + v3) (30)
+
Y4
4!
L4(v2 − v3)(v1 − v2)(v1 − v3)(v12 + v22 + v32 + v1v2 + v1v3 + v2v3) + · · ·
16
(v3 − v4)QLv2eLv2 − (v2 − v4)QLv3eLv3 + (v2 − v3)QLv4eLv4
=
Y2
2!
L2(v3 − v4)(v2 − v4)(v2 − v3) + Y3
3!
L3(v3 − v4)(v2 − v3)(v2 − v4)(v2 + v3 + v4) (31)
+
Y4
4!
L4(v3 − v4)(v2 − v3)(v2 − v4)(v22 + v32 + v42 + v2v3 + v2v4 + v3v4) + · · ·
For a similar settlement, we can also give the lower bound of Y3
Y3 ≥ Y3L = 3!µ
L3(µ− v1 − v2 − v3 − v4) [
QLv1e
Lv1
(v1 − v2)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v4) −
QLv2e
Lv2
(v2 − v3)(v1 − v2)(v2 − v4)
+
QLv3e
Lv3
(v1 − v3)(v2 − v3)(v3 − v4) −
QLv4e
Lv4
(v1 − v4)(v2 − v4)(v3 − v4) ] (32)
− 3!(v1 + v2 + v3 + v4)
µ− v1 − v2 − v3 − v4
QLµe
Lµ − Y L0 − Y1LLµ − Y2
L(Lµ)2
2!
(Lµ)3
Upper bound of QBER e1, e2, e3
According to the condition, the QBER of decoy state is given by17
ELv1QLv1e
Lv1 = e0Y0 + e1Lv1Y1 +
∞∑
n=2
enYn
(Lv1)
n
n!
(33)
ELv2QLv2e
Lv2 = e0Y0 + e1Lv2Y1 +
∞∑
n=2
enYn
(Lv2)
n
n!
(34)
The upper bound of e1 can be obtained directly17
e1 ≤ e1U =
ELv1QLv1e
Lv1 − ELv2QLv2eLv2
(Lv1 − Lv2)Y1L
(35)
17
Combining
ELv1QLv1e
Lv1 −ELv2QLv2eLv2 = e1Y1(Lv1 − Lv2) (36)
+
e2Y2
2!
((Lv1)
2 − (Lv2)2) + e3Y3
3!
((Lv1)
3 − (Lv2)3) + · · ·
ELv2QLv2e
Lv2 −ELv3QLv3eLv3 = e1Y1(Lv2 − Lv3) (37)
+
e2Y2
2!
((Lv2)
2 − (Lv3)2) + e3Y3
3!
((Lv2)
3 − (Lv3)3) + · · ·
and solving the equality
(v2 − v3)ELv1QLv1eLv1 − (v1 − v3)ELv2QLv2eLv2 + (v1 − v2)ELv3QLv3eLv3 (38)
≥ e2Y2L
2
2
(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2)
the upper bound of e2 can be further represented by
e2 ≤ e2U = 2[(v2 − v3)ELv1QLv1e
Lv1 − (v1 − v3)ELv2QLv2eLv2 + (v1 − v2)ELv3QLv3eLv3 ]
L2Y2
L(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2)
(39)
For the same reason, we can obtain the equations followed,
(v2 − v3)ELv1QLv1eLv1 − (v1 − v3)ELv2QLv2eLv2 + (v1 − v2)ELv3QLv3eLv3 (40)
=
e2Y2L
2
2
(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2) + e3Y3L
3
3!
(v2 − v3)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v2)(v1 + v2 + v3) + · · ·
(v3 − v4)ELv2QLv2eLv2 − (v2 − v4)ELv3QLv3eLv3 + (v2 − v3)ELv4QLv4eLv4 (41)
=
e2Y2L
2
2
(v3 − v4)(v2 − v4)(v2 − v3) + e3Y3L
3
3!
(v3 − v4)(v2 − v4)(v2 − v3)(v2 + v3 + v4) + · · ·
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Then, the upper bound of e3 can be shown by
e3 ≤ e3U = 3!
Y3
LL3
[
ELv1QLv1e
Lv1
(v1 − v2)(v1 − v3)(v1 − v4) −
ELv2QLv2e
Lv2
(v2 − v3)(v1 − v2)(v2 − v4)
+
ELv3QLv3e
Lv3
(v1 − v3)(v2 − v3)(v3 − v4) −
ELv3QLv4e
Lv4
(v1 − v4)(v2 − v4)(v3 − v4) ] (42)
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Figure 1 Diagram of RRDPS protocol
Figure 2 (Color online) Key rates versus mean photon number and threshold of
photons in a packet.
Figure 3 (Color online) Comparison for RRDPS protocol using WCPs and HSPS.
The solid curves represent the key rates per packet for using WCPs, the dashed curves
stand for key rates for using HSPS. Lines labeled (i)-(iii) characterize the protocol with
L=128, 64, 32. The error rate is 0.03 and 0.06, respectively. The choices of vth and the
mean photon number µ are optimized.
Figure 4 (Color online) A comparison for the probability of emitting different
numbers of photons between WCPs and HSPS. Here parameters for HSPS are
listed in Table 1, while the intensity is 0.02 for both WCPs and HSPS.
Figure 5 (Color online) Final key rate without and with decoy states. The solid
curves represent the key rates per packet for using WCPs, and the dashed curves
stand for key rates for using HSPS. The length of each packet is fixed at 32. The left
two curves are the key rates of RRDPS protocol with no decoy states, and the other
two are those of the protocol with decoy states.
Figure 6 (Color online) The estimated bounds and asymptotic bounds of yields
and error rates.The solid lines represent estimated bounds of yields and error rates,
and the dashed lines stand for asymptotic bounds of yields and error rates.
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Figure 7 (Color online) Final key rate for using infinite and finite decoy states.
The dotted curve accounts for the key rate per packet for infinite decoy-state, and
the solid curve stands for the four-intensity decoy-state method to estimateY1, Y2, Y3,
e1, e2 and e3. The dashed curve represents for three-intensity decoy-state method
estimating Y1, Y2, e1 ande2, and the dash-dotted one is on behalf of the two-intensity
decoy-state method just estimating Y1 ande1. The choices of the mean photon number
µ are optimized.
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Table 1: Experimental parameters for simulation
ηA dA ed α f
0.045 1.7× 10−6 0.033 0.2dB/km 1.16
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